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by
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The research conducted in this report consists of an in depth examination
of the effect of incentives on the cost, schedule and safety of construction
contracts. The data for this study was obtained from two surveys conducted by
the Construction Industry Institute in 1997 and 1998. This data-base includes
over 400 projects from 100 different companies. Projects are examined based on
cost, schedule and safety factors which are calculated and than compared for
projects with positive incentives, negative incentives, both positive and negative
incentives and no incentives.
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This thesis is an attempt to quantify the benefits or lack of benefits that
incentives introduce into the area of construction contracting. Historically the
owner of a project will use incentives in order to promote attention and efficiency
to an entire project or to a particular aspect of a project.
The types of incentives fall into two primary categories, negative and
positive incentives. The negative incentive is often categorized by some form of
penalty that is applied to the contract for failure to meet specified goals. This
form of incentive is commonly used in those situations where enforcement of the
contract completion date is of particular importance. In these situations the
contract will employ a liquidated damages clause as typically seen in fixed price
contracts. Conversely, positive incentives offer some form of consideration for
exceeding specified goals. The use of this type of incentive to control costs in a
cost reimbursable-type contract is common throughout construction contracting.
Objectives
This report will analyze the effect of incentives on project data collected
by the Construction Industry Institute (CII). Projects with and without incentives
will be compared based on cost, schedule and safety performance.
1

An initial assumption of the effect of negative incentives is necessary to
begin the investigation. It can be theorized that negative incentives would
produce an awareness of certain contract goals and thus would encourage
contractors to meet whatever minimum requirement is necessary to ensure that no
negative impact is realized. Consequently, the principal motivation of the
contractor is not to improve upon the contractual requirements. Rather the
contractor's motivation is simply meeting the minimum requirements that are
commonly set at normal industry standards. Because an owner must provide
realistic goals to avoid accusations of "Impossibility of Performance" and
henceforth costly legal battles, minimum requirements can not be expected to be
overly rigid. Therefore, only a minimum improvement over the normal industry
standards may be specified. As a result, the potential improvement that can be
specified by the owner is limited. On these assumptions, the first hypothesis that
will be proposed is "Projects with negative incentives have slightly better cost,
schedule, and safety performance then projects with no incentives."
A hypothesis about the effect of positive incentives must also be
developed. A positive incentive is based on a minimum standard with some type
of additional consideration for significant improvement upon that minimum
standard. In such a scenario an owner is able to specify that the minimum
standard be set at normal industry expectations. Likewise an owner can then
expect that the contractor will be motivated to improve upon this standard by
using innovation and ingenuity in order to achieve the incentive and maximize
profit. In this case the owner avoids the potential liability of lawsuits while still

achieving above average results. Based on these assumptions, it can be expected
that the motivation to exceed the minimum requirement is greater than that of
negative incentives. Consequently, the second hypothesis proposed is "Projects
with positive incentives have better cost, schedule and safety performance than
projects with no incentives or projects with only negative incentives."
The use of incentives where both positive and negative incentives are used
in a contract is not unusual. A hypothesis about the effect of both positive and
negative incentives must also be developed. Theorizing from previous
assumptions used to propose the first two hypothesis leads to the third hypothesis,
namely that "Projects with both positive and negative incentives have much better
cost, schedule and safety performance than projects with no incentives or projects
with only positive or negative incentives."
The use of incentives for multiple purposes, namely the use of cost,
schedule and safety incentives on the same project also occurs. However, an
analysis of contracts that use incentives for multiple purposes can provide
inaccurate or skewed results. A contractor, in attempting to achieve one incentive
can negatively impact on other incentives. An example of this is a contract that is
heavily loaded with schedule incentives but also has safety incentives. To
illustrate, to meet the schedule incentives and maximize profit, the contractor
undertakes working overtime and long workweeks. This type of scheduling could
easily produce results that show that the safety incentives produced no benefit or
actually produced a negative benefit. Thus results from these mixed incentive
contracts must be examined closely and in context with other factors related to the

project. This study will make no attempt to analyze these mixed incentive
contracts. Only an examination of the effect of incentives on the primary purpose
will be done. For example, cost incentives will be examined solely on their effect
on the cost performance of the project. This methodology of analysis will also be





In this chapter, a review of significant literature and previous research
related to the principles, foundation and use of incentives in construction
contracting is presented. Given that literature discussing incentives in
construction contracts is not abundant, this chapter provides background
information that assists in understanding the subject of incentives by linking
together major concepts.
Construction project data such as that gathered by CII has not been
available before this time. The difficulty in obtaining financial data due to
concerns from contractors regarding competitive advantages has been the primary
stumbling block. The CII data used in this study includes over 400 projects
obtained from approximately 100 companies. Because of the potential negative
impact the results of this study could have upon the competitive capability of the
companies involved, no company names or company comparisons have been used
in this analysis.
Most discussion of incentives revolves around the issue of how to use
incentives with an accepted premise that incentives are effective. This then leads
to the question of whether incentives are effective, and if so, whether benefits can

be quantified. And finally, what types of incentives are best? These are some of
the issues that will be the focus of this analysis.
Previous attempts to analyze incentives have been based on a total cost
evaluation of the contract with little attention given to specific factors that
describe the "health" of a construction contract. A contract can superficially
appear to be successful in that it meets an incentive clause, yet suffer serious
deficiencies in other areas. A look at factors that describe cost growth or project
safety may show that even though the contractor was successful in meeting a
schedule incentive, the overall project suffered in other key areas.
History of Incentive Contracting
The history of incentives in construction contracts most likely started in
the Stone Age. Some ambitious Neanderthal probably contracted to build a
primitive dwelling with a scheduled completion date before the first winter storm.
The incentive being that he would get a knock on the head (from his mate, no
less!) if he failed to complete the contract by the proscribed event.
In all seriousness, the incentive contract has been around in some form or
another for a long time. The military used an incentive contract with the Wright
Brothers to construct the first military airplane in 1908. This performance
incentive included a provision for a target speed of 40 mph with a target price of
$25,000. Also included in the contract was a provision calling for a sliding scale
of payments based on the actual airspeed of the plane. This contract had a very

steep incentive price of $15,000 if the minimum airspeed of 36 mph was obtained
and a price of $35,000 for the maximum airspeed of 44 mph. 1
While the contract entered in between the Wright Brothers and the
military shows that incentive contracts are not a recent phenomenon, incentive
contract use increased after World War II.
The employment of incentive contracts on a formalized basis can be found
in the aircraft industry after World War II. After the war the incentive contract
became the practice in follow-on production situations where the dollar value of
contracts was large, the configuration of the aircraft was constantly changing and
companies were often financially incapable of taking large risks. In this situation
work was normally begun on a letter contract or a delayed target incentive
contract with the target price being established after a substantial amount of work
under the contract had been completed. In this industry, the contractors had cost
accounting systems where lot costs were collected and used for pricing purposes;
and where the learning curve technique was available to estimate future costs. As
a result, the use of the incentive contract was in a situation where the aircraft was
already designed, previous articles had been manufactured, unusually accurate
cost information was available, good pricing techniques were present and the
contractor had incurred a substantial amount of experience on the job. The
incentive contracts that resulted were normally performed without substantial
variation from the negotiated targets. 2
1 Nash p. 3
2 Nash p. 4

Recent history of incentive contracting has been quite different from that
of many years ago. Present incentive contracts cover a group of products much
more diverse than in the past. The work in incentive contracts today is forward
priced, without the benefit of having started and completed a large amount of the
project. These factors make understanding incentives complex and the actual
effect of the incentive problematic. 3
Construction Contracts
A construction contract can be defined as "[a] contract under which one
party promises to furnish services and materials to build a structure or to improve
real property for another who promises to pay for the work performed."4 Since
construction contracts are typically drafted by the owner of the project and then
competitively bid, it is not surprising that the terms of the contract tend to favor
the owner. The contractor usually has no say in the terms other than to refuse to
bid on the work, an option not favored by most contractors.
The construction contract is made up of three critical elements: scope of
work, schedule and price. In a construction contract these three elements are
normally described in a large document called the contract documents. The
contract documents in turn has five primary elements. These five elements are the
Agreement between the Owner and Contractor, General Conditions, Special
Conditions (Supplementary Conditions), Drawings and Specifications. 5
3 Nash p. 4
4 Frein p. 48
5 Hapke p. 25-26

The Agreement between Owner and Contractor includes references to the
owner, contractor and designer along with mailing and business addresses.
Frequently there will be a listing of articles setting forth the contract documents
applicable to the project; a brief description of the project; dates for
commencement and completion; contract price; and other relevant miscellaneous
provisions.
The General Conditions is a list of ground rules by which the owner,
designer and contractor will abide by during the actual construction. Items
contained here include information concerning the status and authority of the
designer, owner, contractor and subcontractors; the circumstances under which
work may be performed by the owner; rules concerning progress, completion and
delays, progress and final payments; insurance, and other miscellaneous
provisions.
Special conditions (Supplementary Conditions) are more project specific
than General Conditions. The purpose of special conditions is to address
variations unique to individual projects, requirements of individual owners and
variations in specific legal requirements. Special conditions will frequently cover
the same topics as do the General Conditions, only in greater detail.
Fourth, drawings consist of scale and/or schematic drawings depicting the
various features of the project which are best described graphically. Drawings are
numbered and divided according to the specific elements of the project and the
various trades.

Finally, the specification element is a detailed numerical and word
description of the work that sets the standard for the quality and quantity of the
detailed elements that comprise the entire project. The Construction
Specifications Institute (CSI) has developed an industry standard specification
system that has sixteen major divisions. Each division deals with a particular
trade of work and describes in detail how that work is to be accomplished.
Types of Construction Contracts
Essentially there are two types of contracts: fixed-price and cost
reimbursable. The difference between these two contracts is the allocation of risk
and the contractor's fee structure.6
Incentive contracts take many forms, with the actual incentive relying
heavily upon the type of contract being used by the owner. Thus, it is easy to see
that an owner that offers a cost reimbursable contract for bid would seriously
consider offering an incentive to control costs, so that the owner established
financial goals for the project are met. One may argue that almost every contract
is a type of incentive contract with the incentive being to make a profit. The firm
fixed price contract, which has long been considered the favored contractual form,
is the ultimate incentive contract. The incentive being that the contractor accepts
the full responsibility for all cost overruns. The only difference between the
incentive contract and the firm fixed price contract is that in the use of the
6 Workman p. 16
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incentive contract, the contractor takes a smaller share of the total cost
responsibility. 7
Other types of contracts encourage different forms of incentives. To
illustrate, almost any contract could have an incentive to encourage safety and
reduce reportable accidents. The construction industry is inherently a dangerous
occupation, and in fact, construction trades traditionally have higher rates of on-
the-job accidents then other industries. As a result, workman's compensation and
liability insurance for contractors and owners has been at a premium. Contractors
who do not promote on-the-job safety quickly find themselves paying outrageous
rates for insurance, reducing their ability to competitively bid for future projects.
High accident rates have also been known to cause negative public reaction and
can impact the positive public image that most owners and contractors find
essential. As a result, safety incentives on all types of contracts have become
standard among construction industry leaders.
In recent years, schedule incentives have seen a rise in their application m
order to meet the demand for new product lines. The fast-track effort to get a
product to market from initial conception includes a substantial time for
construction of manufacturing facilities. Consequently, positive incentives for on
time or early completion and negative incentives for late completion have become
popular.
The number of incentives offered by an owner is limited only by the
imagination of the contracting officer. Incentives can be given for quality,
7 Nash p. 3
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schedule, safety, cost, and in sum, just about anything else of significance. One
of the most frequently used incentives is an incentive on the cost performance of a
contract. Such incentives are the most simple to administer and the easiest to
negotiate.8 The two basic types of contracts used to provide incentives on cost are
the fixed price incentive and the cost plus incentive fee contract. The fixed price
incentive contract contains a fixed ceiling price, has an unlimited range of sharing
of costs and is settled by negotiation of a final "fixed" price near the completion
of performance. 9 Conversely, the cost plus incentive fee contract contains no
ceiling, has a range of cost sharing limited by the maximum and minimum fee,
and is settled by vouchering all costs. 10 However, the incentive formulas in these
two types of contracts operate in a similar manner. 11 There are many other types
of contracts that use incentives.
The firm fixed price or lump sum contract is the most commonly used
contract. As the name implies, this contract is based on a fixed price that is
agreed upon before construction begins. The contractor performs all of the work
required for construction of the project in accordance with the plans,
specifications, and other contractual documents, with the profit included in the
lump sum. 12 Usually included in this contract is a negative incentive where the
contractor is penalized for failure to meet the completion date.
8 Nash p. 8
9 Nash p. 8
10 Nash p. 8




The cost plus percentage fee contract is a contract where the material,
labor, equipment rental, and all other associated costs are tallied up and an
additional percentage of this cost is given to the contractor as profit. Since the
contractor's profit is a direct percentage of the overall cost, there is little
motivation by the contractor to control costs. Thus, cost incentives are popular in
this cost plus percentage fee contracts. 13
The cost plus fixed fee contract is a contract where the contractor receives
only the stipulated fee for his part in overseeing and running the job regardless of
the cost of the project. 14 Again, there is little motivation to control costs.
Consequently, cost incentives are used frequently with this type of contract.
Another type of incentive contract that has become popular is the award
fee contract. This type of incentive contract has a base contract, either a fixed-
price or a cost contract. The award fee contract has an award fee that is given to
the contractor at specified intervals for superior work. The terms of this contract
usually specify some arbitrary scale that is used by the owner to measure
performance to determine the amount of the award fee. The award fee is optional,
with the owner unilaterally awarding an amount that is deemed to represent the
contractor's performance. In government contracts this award fee is not subject to
a disputes clause. 15 Contracts of this type have typically been used in facility
support contracts.
13 Dunham p. 131




Although no contract type is perfect for every situation, there is a natural
tendency to prefer a fixed price contract wherever it can be used. 16 This tendency
stems from the sense of security in risk allocation and price assurance that an
owner perceives and the inherent incentive of a contractor to manage efficiently.
In recent years, cost-type contracts have seen a rise in popularity as owners have
experienced increased pressure to get new products to market in shorter periods of
time. This pressure has resulted in a situation where the schedule for completion
becomes the foremost priority. The planning and programming of the project is
usually reduced to a minimum, fast-tracking of the project takes place and
construction is begun before the design is complete. Consequently, owners,
recognizing that an inordinate amount of the risk of the project is being placed
upon the contractor, have chosen to use a cost type contract in these situations.
Regardless of the type of contract, the use of incentives must be done
judiciously and with the objectives of the project clearly in focus.
Types of Incentives
Negative Incentives/Liquidated Damages
The hypothetical stone-age case and the illustrated firm fixed price
contract example described previously both had negative incentives. Negative
schedule incentives, in the form of liquidated damages, have been common in the
construction industry. Nowhere is the old adage of "time is money" truer than in
16 Smith, et al, p. 911
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a construction project. An owner develops an expected schedule for occupying a
facility based on the construction contract and plans accordingly. Therefore, it is
imperative that the facility be completed on time so that the facility can be used.
Sides Construction Company v. City of Scott City, 581 S.W.2d 443 (Mo.
App. 1979) illustrates the importance of adhering to the completion date set forth
in the contract. In Sides Construction, the failure of the contractor to complete a
swimming pool forced the city to hire additional engineering personnel and
resulted in a loss of revenue on the project for the city. However, in those cases
where there is no substantial prejudice to the owner due to the delay of the
contractor or the delay is occasioned by mutual error, the courts have been
reluctant to award damages. 17
Another example of the importance of adhering to the terms of the
contract is illustrated in San Ore-Gardner v. Missouri Railroad Company, 496 F.
Supp. 1337 (E.D. Ark. 1980) where the court refused to enforce the liquidated
damages clause. The liquidated damages clause was considered to be a penalty
by nature. The court deemed that the clause did not appear to be a bona fide
attempt by both contracting parties to agree upon a reasonable compensation for
any harm which would be caused by delayed performance.
Another case, Department of Transportation v. Fortune Bridge Company,
243 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. App. 1978) established a test to aid in determining whether a
clause is a valid liquidated damages provision or an invalid penalty. The test
established in Department of Transportation, is whether the injury caused by the
17 Hapke p. 26
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breach is difficult or impossible to accurately estimate; whether the parties
intended to provide for damages or a penalty; and whether the sum stipulated is a
reasonable pre-estimate of the probable loss. 18
Negative incentives in the form of liquidated damages have been in use for
a long time. However, the actual benefit of the negative incentive is questionable,
with previous research showing that negative incentives provide little benefit and
in some cases can detrimentally affect the project. 19
Positive Incentives/Bonus Incentives
Contractual incentives for construction are often referred to as being
positive in nature when in fact they can be positive, negative or both. 20 Generally
speaking, there is no positive incentive without a corresponding negative
incentive.
Incentives in construction contracts connote "profit adjustment" to the
contractor. They are tied to performance measures and somehow increase or
decrease the contractor's profit margin. Tailoring the incentive to the value
received by the owner is of great importance. 21 In order to accomplish this the
owner must decide what areas of performance are of significant importance. The
owner must then determine how to tie the incentive to better contractor
performance.
18 Hapke p. 27
19 Workman p. 71
20 Stukhart, p. 34, BR Report A-7,




One area where positive incentives are frequently used is in cost
performance. Cost incentives are generally thought of as being a combination of
an inducement and a threat. An example is the target type contract where there is
a bonus penalty directly tied to the final cost of the construction to the owner.
Among owners, there appears to be a trend to tie performance measures to
an encouragement incentive or "bonus only" provision. 22 In fact, some owners
believe "that penalty clauses are negative incentives that turn off even the most
conscientious of contractors."23
Positive incentives as a whole have been endorsed by previous studies. In
the study completed in 1985 by B.W. Workman,24 there was evidence that the use
of positive incentives significantly improved contract performance. Despite this,
there remains reluctance among owners to fully utilize this type of incentive.
A possible reason for this lies in the inherent disadvantages of positive
incentives. Disadvantages include: the owner's difficulty in establishing fair and
equitable targets, additional administrative resources, extra negotiations,
substantially completed project engineering, difficulty in changing goals and
priorities after a contract is awarded and the lack of quantifiable benefits by using
the positive incentive. 25 These disadvantages all contribute to make the task of
adding incentives to a contract a daunting task.
22 Workman p. 25
23 Sykes, p. 63
24 Workman




The motivation for a contractor to complete a project in a timely manner
with adequate quality rests primarily in "pride and profit." 26 Since pride cannot
be harnessed and used by the owner, the only motivation that an owner can
provide is through the compensation system outlined in the contract. 27 As such,
there are many variations of construction contracts that seek to make use of this
profit motive.
Due to the fact that a cost based contract does not provide a contractor
with motivation to decrease costs in order to earn his fee, cost and fee incentives
were devised in order to motivate contractor efforts and to discourage inefficiency
and waste. Inefficiency and waste are discouraged by the use of predetermined
incentives on performance or delivery coupled with concurrent increases in profit
or fee provided for achievement that surpasses the targets, and decreases are to the
extent that such targets are not met.28
Incentive contracts include a target cost, a target profit or fee, and a profit
or fee adjustment formula tied to the relationship between actual reimbursable
costs incurred by the contractor and target costs. 29 In lieu of costs, targets may
come in the form of a specific performance characteristic such as the production
capacity of a manufacturing plant. The following formula establishes what the
fee a contractor receives is: 30
26 Smith, et al, p. 911
27 Workman p. 16
28 FAR 16.401(b)
29 FAR 16.403-1 and 404-1
18

Fc = F, - k (C - O (Eq. H-l)
Where: Fc = Contractor's actual fee received
Ft = Target fee
C - Actual cost of the project
Q = Target cost established in the contract
K = Sharing ratio of the contractor
In a pure fixed-price contract the contractor assumes the risk of the
outcome of actual project cost (k = 1) and the fee received by the contractor
equals the target fee per its estimate plus any differential in actual cost below that
estimated. The equation can be reduced and expressed as follows: 31
Fc = F, - ( C - Q
)
(Eq. II-2)
In a pure cost-reimbursable contract the owner assumes the risk of actual
project cost (k = 0) and the fee received by the contractor equals the target fee
negotiated. 32 The formula can then be expressed as:
F£ = Ft (Eq II-3)
30 Stukhart, p. 35
31 Workman p. 17
32 Workman p. 17
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The target fee can be a fixed amount where Fc is a constant or it can be a
percentage of the actual cost to the owner and Fc becomes a variable. The number
of variations where the sharing ratio is between the extremes of one and zero is
unlimited. This type of fee structure implies a sharing of any cost over-run or
under-run, subject to any imposed limitations, and hence has been labeled as a
cost incentive contract. A typical fixed price incentive contract or cost plus
incentive fee contract will have a sharing arrangement illustrated by the following
example:











The target cost in either type of incentive contract is usually the focal
point of the contract since it is the accepted practice to attempt to arrive at a
mutual acceptable target cost before establishing the remainder of the formula. 33
The target cost is also important in the operation of the incentive formula since it
is the fulcrum around which the formula revolves. The formula states that if
33 Nash p. 9-12
20

actual costs exceed target costs, profit is reduced and if actual costs are less than
target costs, profit is increased. Hence, the target cost is the basis for setting the
profit or fee and also serves as point around which profit fluctuates during
contract performance. 34
Figures II- 1 and II-2 show the graphical representation of the typical fixed
price incentive contract and the cost plus incentive fee contract for the formulas
discussed above. These graphs depict the actual amount of profit to be paid to a
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Figure II -1, Fixed Price Incentive Contract Fee Graph
34 Nash p. 12
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Figure II - 2, Cost Plus Incentive Contract Fee Graph
Incentive Fee Goals
The objective of incentive programs should be to promote the goals of the
owner and "to produce a harmonious relationship between the owner and
contractor [in order] to achieve beneficial end results for both." 36 To promote this
type of relationship between owners and contractors, owners should seek input
from the contractor on how best to implement the goals of the owner. The
following is list of seven elements for a successful incentive program: 37
The owner thoroughly thought out the objectives and
established priorities with the contractor
36 Carmody, p. 33
37 Carmody, p. 34
22

participating in establishing appropriate
incentives;
Sufficient time was spent to adequately measure
accomplishments;
Arrangement was agreed upon at the initiation of the
contract;
The method of setting targets was specified when
actual target values are to be established at a later
time;
Written rule prevented continual nitpicking;
The contractor was in control of the situation as soon
as the measures of performance were determined;
and
Targets were established to reflect competent
performance with some tolerance for error and
contingency.
The goals of an incentive program must be to "motivate the contractor to
produce a system that will meet or surpass performance goals, on or before a
target date, and within a target cost." 38 "Competence must therefore be the
benchmark, or the null point, from which positive incentives can be set for
performance which is clearly superior to the benchmark." 39 Incentives should be
designed so that a win-win situation exists between the contractor and the owner.
If the incentive program is skewed towards one party then the feeling of being
cheated will exist. If the contractor feels that an incentive is an impractical goal,
not financially worth pursuing, then the purpose of the owner in including an
incentive has been defeated. On the other hand, if an incentive unduly awards the
contractor additional profit for little additional performance, then the owner will
38 Finchum, p. 389
39 Carmody, p. 33
23

find any contractor request for additional compensation, even if warranted,
difficult to accept.
Previous Research Results
In September 1959 a survey by the San Francisco section of the American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Construction Division was conducted. The
basic objective was to determine current practices in contracting administration. 40
This research was performed on San Francisco area ASCE members using a forty-
eight-question survey. A total of 300 respondents completed the survey. Survey
results showed that for construction contracts, 75 percent use liquidated damages
provisions and 77 percent do not provide bonus provisions.
The study of the ASCE concluded that the current practice of using
liquidated damage clauses is believed to lead to overall contract economy. In
addition, the committee concluded that current practice does not provide bonus
provisions or invite proposals with optional or alternative completion times.
A second research study conducted by Billy Wayne Workman, Jr. in 1985
utilized survey responses from Construction Industry Institute companies. 41 The
survey consisted of 36 completed questionnaires. The study determined that
safety performance is better for contracts with positive incentives. Schedule
performance was also shown to be better for contracts with positive incentives
than for contracts with negative incentives. Other performance measures also
40 Special Committee, p. 1
41 Workman, p. 71
24

appeared to yield better results where positive incentives were employed instead
of negative incentives. Negative incentives appeared to hamper project
performance, and in fact, appeared to lower performance outcomes below the




Data Gathering by the Construction Industry Institute
This CII data was collected from CII member companies from two
separately conducted surveys. Each survey consists of two questionnaires. One
questionnaire was addressed to CII Construction Companies that did the actual
construction; the other was sent to CII member companies that were the owners of
the projects. No effort was made to obtain data from an owner and a contractor
on the same project, although the possibility that data from two different sources
on the same project exists.
Data from these questionnaires was collected by CII and formatted into
spreadsheets with all company names deleted to provide confidentiality.
First CII Survey
The CII Benchmarking and Metrics Committee performed the first round
of data collection and analysis in 1996 (version 1.0). In this data collection effort,
22 owner companies and 25 contractor companies, all members of CII,
participated by submitting 94 projects and 119 projects, respectively. These
projects represent $11.5 billion of total cost in the heavy industrial, light
industrial, infrastructure, and building groups within the construction industry.
The response rate for projects submitted was approximately 4.5 projects per
26

participating company. A total of 213 projects that met specified criteria were
submitted in this first round of data collection. Table III -1 provides a summary
distribution of the types of projects submitted.42
Owners Contractors Total
Buildings 20 13 33
Heavy Industrial 51 71 122
Infrastructure 9 23 32
Light Industrial 14 12 26
Total 94 119 213
Table III - 1, Summary of Project Distribution, First Survey
While an owner is responsible for the entire project, from conception to
operation, a contractor only has responsibility for a portion of the total project.
Figure III - 1 shows the contractor's responsibility for the 119 projects submitted.
It should be noted that the contractors in each category might have responsibility
for all or only a portion of the functions in question. 43
The overall cost of the projects in this database ranges between $5 million
and $500 million in project capitalization. As shown in Figure III - 2,
approximately one-third of the contracts had a cost of less then $15 million, one-
third had a cost between $15 million and $50 million and one-third had a cost in
excess of $50 million.44
42 Benchmarking Report p. x
43 Benchmarking p. 8
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Figure III - 2, Distribution of Project Cost, First Survey
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Projects in the database can be categorized by what is called the "nature"
of the project. This is a categorization based on whether the project is a grass
roots project, an addition, or a modernization. With the definition of these terms
being that a grass-roots project is a new facility; an addition being a project which
ties into an existing facility; and a modernization a project for which a substantial
amount of equipment or structure is replaced or modified. Figure III - 3 illustrates
















Figure III - 3, Nature of Projects, First Survey




The CII Benchmarking and Metrics Committee followed up the first round
of data collection with a second round performed in 1997 (version 2.0). In the
second data collection effort, 22 owner companies and 19 contractor companies
participated by submitting 90 projects and 94 projects, respectively. These
projects represented $9.1 billion of total cost within the heavy industrial, light
industrial, infrastructure, and building groups of the construction industry. A total
of 184 projects that met specified criteria were submitted in this survey. Table III
-2 provides a summary distribution of the type of projects in this database. 46
Owners Contractors Total
Buildings 21 4 25
Heavy Industrial 48 80 128
Infrastructure 6 2 8
Light Industrial 15 8 23
Total 90 94 184
Table III - 2, Summary of Project Distribution, Second Survey
Figure III - 4 shows the contractor's responsibility for the 94 projects
submitted in the second survey. It should be noted that the contractors in each
category might have responsibility for all or only a portion of the functions in
question.47 It should also be noted that the 2nd survey consisted of more design
and design and construction contracts than the first survey.
46 Morrow







Since a contract can have negative incentives, positive incentives or a
combination of both types of incentives, any examination of the effects of
incentives must be done from a macro perspective. An examination of the "big
picture," in which the effects of the incentives as a whole on construction contract
performance is studied, should provide beneficial results. An analysis of the
effect of individual incentives on specific areas of a project will be conducted
where the data is sufficient to enable a comparison between contracts with and
without incentives.
The information for this study was taken from the raw data of each project
and examined by the type of incentive offered in the construction phase. The
construction phase is the primary phase in which the largest amounts of resources
are committed. Traditionally less then 5% of the total project cost is committed to
the pre-project planning. An additional 15% of the total cost is used for the
design effort. 48 Therefore, the total construction effort including procured
equipment totals approximately 80% of the cost of a project.
An examination of the construction phase should provide the most
potential return. Also, data compiled from the contractors would only support a
48 Metrics, notes 3/3 1/97
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Figure III - 6, Nature of the Projects, Second Survey
Figure III - 5 shows the cost distribution for the projects in the second
survey and Figure III - 6 shows the nature of the projects in the second survey.
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construction phase analysis since many contractors had no knowledge or
involvement in the pre-construction phases of the project. An examination of the
effect of incentives on other phases such as the design phase could be
accomplished by developing or modifying the cost, schedule and safety factors
that are being used for the construction phase analysis and then utilizing the
owner data for analysis.
First Survey Questions
The first survey by CII consisted of a total of 38 questions dealing with
many aspects of a construction project. This study will only use a small portion
of the available data in the analysis of the effect of incentives. The data from
questions that will be used are:
1) Incentive Data from Question 1
1
2) Cost Data from Questions 12, 13, and 14
3) Schedule Data from Question 15
4) Safety Data from Question 1
8
Second Survey Questions
The second survey conducted by CII consisted of a total of 41 questions.
As in the first survey, these questions deal with many aspects of these
construction projects. Questions from the second survey that will be used are:
1) Incentive Data from Question 10
2) Cost Data from Questions 11a, 12, 13
3) Schedule Data from Questions 14, 15




The analysis will begin by separating the contracts with cost incentives v.
contracts without cost incentives. These contracts will then be further grouped
based on the type of cost incentive. Contracts with positive, negative or both
positive and negative incentives will be grouped together for the analysis. The
same separation for contracts with and without both schedule and safety
incentives will also be undertaken. The data will be further examined by
subdividing the data from each survey into owner and contractor data for
examination.
Once the projects have been subdivided, calculation of the factors to be
used for analysis will be done. Budget Factors, Cost Growth Factors, Schedule
Factors, Schedule Growth Factors, Reportable Incident Rate (RIR) and Lost
Workday Case Incident Rate (LWCIR) will be calculated for each project.
Specific formulas for each of these factors are as follows:
Cost Analysis
1) Budget Factor = Actual Cost /(Authorized Cost
+ Change Order Cost)
2) Cost Growth = Actual Cost-Authorized
Cost/Authorized Cost
Schedule Analysis
3) Schedule Factor = Actual Schedule/(Estimated
Schedule + Change Order Schedule)





1) RIR = Recordable Incidents * 200,000/Work
Hours
2) LWCIR = Lost Workday Cases * 200,000/Work
Hours
The mean (average), median, standard deviation and variance will then be
calculated for each of the factors in an attempt to determine the statistical validity
of the data. The validity of the data will further be examined by looking at the
distribution of the data using histograms. Histograms for each factor for both
owners and contractors will be developed to see if the data is normally distributed
plots. An additional examination of the calculated factors will then be done using
the statistical F-test methodology. The F-Test is used to determine if statistical
significance is exhibited by the data. The F-test for significance is calculated
using the formula:
F = (BSS/DF) / (WSS/DF)
Where: BSS = Between Sum of Squares
WSS = Within Sum of Squares
DF = Degrees of Freedom (N- 1 ) or (k-1
)
A comparison of the values calculated and these critical values for the
population, with one degree of freedom, will be accomplished. The calculated F-
test value must meet the critical F-test value to show that a clear difference
between projects with and without incentives exists. The critical values that will
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be used in this evaluation are standard and can be referenced in almost any
statistics book49 . In the case that the data does not meet the F-test, then further
examination to determine causation will be attempted. Although the data might
not meet the F-Test, that does not mean that the data is not valid. Failure of this
test means that although a clear-cut difference between the data does not exist
statistically, there can still be obvious trends that can be observed. A further
analysis of possible trends based on these observations, whether the F-test is met
or not, will be done.






The projects included in the CII database consisted of different types of
contracts. Many of these contracts include contractors that do not directly
supervise craftsmen. Therefore, only those contractors that had direct control
over the construction of the project could be included in this examination.
Contractor functions that were included consisted of general contractors, prime
contractors, sub-contractors or those contractors involved in demolition work.
The primary objective of this research is to compare projects with positive,
negative, or a combination of positive and negative incentives versus contracts
with no incentives in the areas of cost, schedule and safety. Therefore, the budget
factor and the cost growth factor will be used to provide an analysis of the effect
of cost incentives. Similarly, the schedule factor and the schedule growth factor
will be used for evaluation of schedule incentives and the reportable incident rate
(RIR) and lost work day incident rate (LWCIR) will be used to grade the
performance of safety incentives.
This examination will not evaluate performance in areas not directly
affected by the incentive being offered. For example, contracts with a cost
incentive will only be evaluated by examining the budget and cost growth factors.
Attempting to evaluate these cost incentive projects for safety or schedule
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performance, without including a process by which possible incentives for safety
or schedule are included would provide highly inaccurate results.
Not all contracts included in this database had incentives. In fact the
majority did not have any type of incentives. Table V - 1 shows all the projects in
this database arranged by the type of incentive in the construction phase. This
table also separates the data from the first and second surveys and separates the
data by contractor and owner. An examination of this table shows that this
database consists of 397 projects on which data was obtained. It should also be
noted that while the number of projects with positive, negative, both positive and
negative or no incentives is sufficient to provide accurate results, there are a
number of incentive types that have a limited number of projects.
Some types of incentives are not commonly used in the construction
industry. As Table V - 1 illustrates; negative cost and safety incentives are rarely
used. Although this study will use the available projects in these areas to perform
an analysis, the results are prejudiced by the limited data for these types of
projects. Therefore, any conclusion must be taken in the context of this
limitation. All other contract incentive situations have sufficient data to provide
results with a high confidence level in the accuracy of those results.
Another limitation that was evident was the fact that some projects
included in the database have insufficient or non-existent data in certain areas
needed for this examination. Some of the projects submitted did not have cost




Number of Projects w/Incentives (Construction Phase)
Type of Incentive Cost Schedule Safety
Contractor
First Survey
Positive 30 31 25
Negative 3 19 2
Both 16 25 7
None 70 44 85
Sub Total 119 119 119
Second
Survey
Positive 15 11 12
Negative 2 9 1
Both 2 2
None 75 72 81
Sub Total 94 94 94
Owner
First Survey
Positive 16 15 27
Negative 9
Both 4 7 1
None 74 63 66
Sub Total 94 94 94
Second
Survey
Positive 12 13 15
Negative 1 3 6
Both 7 7 51
None 70 67 18
Sub Total 90 90 90
Total Contractor 213 213 213
Total Owner 184 184 184
Total 397 397 397
Table V - 1, Projects with Construction Phase Incentives
for those parts of the research where the data was sufficient. As a result, each of
the factors as calculated is based on a different number of projects, depending on
how many projects had sufficient data. Although this did reduce the overall
number of projects with incentives, the data was still sufficient to provide




The metrics used in this examination provide a basis for comparison. Six
factors were used to evaluate cost, schedule and safety performance. The cost and
schedule factors used were developed by the Construction Industry Institute,
although they have been modified to examine only the construction phase of each
project. These factors provide a unique prospective into the "health" of these
projects.
The budget factor used herein is a ratio of the actual construction cost of
the project to the budgeted construction cost plus the cost of authorized change
orders. A budget factor of unity ( 1 .0) represents perfect predictability. A value of
less than unity represents cost under-run, while a value greater than unity
represents cost overrun.
The cost growth factor used is the ratio of the difference between the
actual construction cost of the project and the construction budget to the
construction budget. Cost growth measures financial predictability with no
allowance for changes. The primary difference between budget factor and cost
growth is the inclusion of the change order cost in the budget factor.
The two safety performance metrics used are the recordable incident rate
(RIR) and the lost workday case incident rate (LWCIR). The definition of these
two factors is identical to those as defined by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). RIR being recordable incidents times 200,000 divided
by the total work hours for the project. LWCIR is similarly defined as lost
workday cases times 200,000 divided by total project work hours.
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The schedule factor used is a measure of duration predictability. The
schedule factor is derived from the ratio of the actual construction duration to the
predicted construction duration plus change order impact. A schedule factor of
unity represents perfect predictability, a value less then one represents a schedule
under-run while greater then one is a schedule over-run.
Schedule growth is a ratio of the difference between the actual total
duration of the construction and the predicted construction duration to the
predicted construction duration. Schedule growth measures duration
predictability with no allowances for owner changes. The difference between
schedule factor and schedule growth is that schedule factor includes owner
authorized changes while schedule growth does not.
The factors for all projects were calculated and tabulated by first or second
survey and by owner or contractor. Due to limitations on the number of incentive
projects in some areas, the analysis will examine all results based on all the
available data. Data calculations for each sub-division are provided in Appendix
A.
Cost Incentive Analysis
Table V - 2 shows the calculated factor analysis that was completed for
projects with cost incentives. Note that this table is a summary of all the data
collected from both contractors and owners. As this indicates, the total number of
contracts with negative incentives that could be used for analysis ranged from six
42
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to four projects. Other types of incentives had at least 24 projects upon which to
base the analysis. Means, medians, standard deviations and variance were also
calculated. An F-Test analysis, which compares each type of incentive to the
other types of incentives and to projects without incentives was also completed.
The statistical validity of the data used was determined by the use of
histograms. The data, when plotted, should have a tendency to take on a "bell-
shaped" or normal curve distribution. Figure V - 1 is the histogram showing an




Figure V - 1, Histogram, Cost Incentives Effect on Budget Factor
analysis for the budget factor. Figure V - 1 plots the frequency versus budget
factor for projects with positive, negative, both positive and negative and projects
without cost incentives. As the histogram plot indicates, the data shows a normal
44

curve for projects with positive incentives, positive and negative incentives, and
projects with no cost incentives. The plot for projects with negative incentives
has insufficient data to make any conclusions. Arguably, sufficient data on
projects with negative incentives would provide results similar to those obtained
for the other types of incentives. This histogram demonstrates that the data
obtained is valid and that the results are meaningful.
The budget factor axis of symmetry for positive and no incentive projects
is on or about a budget factor value of 1.0. As previously noted, this is the point
of high predictability or the unity value. At this point the project budget is
approximately equal to what was predicted. The results for projects with both
positive and negative incentives are less clear. Here the curve appears to be
centered on a vertical axis at a budget factor of about 1.05. This indicates that
contracts with a combination of both types of incentives appear to be less
predictable, and experience over-runs.
The cost growth factor is the other measure by which cost incentives will
be examined. Figure V - 2 is a histogram plot for each type of incentive for the
cost growth factor. As shown in this figure, the plots have normal curve
tendencies. Interestingly, there appears to be a "dip" in the curve at the cost
growth value of 0. 1 for projects with no incentives or positive incentives. Also,
the plot for both types of incentives shows a drop off at a cost growth value of
0.1. At this time it is unknown what factors are causing this behavior. Overall
this plot indicates that cost growth seems to be normally distributed, but that there
















Figure V - 2, Histogram, Cost Incentives Effect on Cost Growth Factor
that slightly exceed the predicted cost and those that significantly exceed the cost
prediction. No conjecture on this can be made without sufficient examination of
these projects and close study of other influencing factors. Despite this deviation,
the results of this study can still be expected to produce acceptable results.
The second statistical tool that was used to provide an evaluation of the
significance difference in the data was the F-test. F- test factors were calculated
to determine if the data exhibited significant differences based on the type of
incentive. An evaluation of the F-test values, as calculated, and the critical F-test
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values shows that none of the F-test values meet the critical value to show-
significant difference in the data. Although this test is not met, it could be that the
effects of cost incentives are very small, small enough that the F-test would not be
able to differentiate between contracts with or without incentives. This result is
not unexpected. Since a construction project has many expenses that are not
affected by cost incentives, the potential for improvement upon these factors
would be measured in small increments. Small changes such as this would not be
noticeable to the F-test, which looks for significant differences between the data
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A trend analysis of the budget and cost growth factors was then
completed. The potential increases or decreases of the budget factor and the cost
growth factor, based on the type of incentive, is shown in Figure V - 3. Figure V
- 3 illustrates that the type of incentive employed does have an effect on the cost
performance of the project. As can be seen, the budget factor showed only small
increases for projects with a combination of incentives over those with a positive
incentive and larger increases over projects with negative or no incentives. This
would appear to substantiate the hypothesis that contracts with both positive and
negative incentives would have the best cost performance. Positive incentives
also performed well, showing corresponding increases in performance over those
contracts with negative incentives or no incentives. This substantiates the
hypothesis that those contracts with positive incentives have better cost
performance than projects with negative incentives or projects with no incentives.
Negative incentives did not perform as theorized, with significantly lower cost
performance than those projects with no incentives. This is directly in contrast to
the hypothesis that theorized that projects with negative incentives have slightly
better cost performance then those with no incentives.
The cost growth analysis shows a similar graph for positive, both positive
and negative incentives and no incentives. The cost growth trend shown here
indicates either no improvement, or slightly lower performance than projects with
no incentives. As with the budget factor, the cost growth factor for negative cost
48

incentive projects showed significantly inferior performance results than projects
with any other type of incentive.
This trend analysis shows that a positive or both positive and negative cost
incentives can provide some benefit to cost performance. More importantly
though, this graphically shows that the use of negative cost incentives leads to
significantly decreased cost performance. For these projects, the use of negative
cost incentives leads to a projected cost growth increase of 12% and a budget
factor increase of 6%. Thus, the use of negative cost incentives should be
avoided.
Schedule Incentives
Table V - 3 shows the calculated factor analysis that was completed for
projects with schedule incentives. As with the cost incentive analysis, this table is
a summary of all the data collected from both contractors and owners on both
surveys. The total number of projects for each type of incentive is evenly
distributed, with at least 32 projects available for each factor analysis. Means,
medians, standard deviations and variance were calculated for each of the factors.
The F-Test analysis that compares each type of incentive to the other types of
incentives and to projects with no incentives is also shown.
The statistical validity of the data used was determined by the use of
histograms. Figure V - 4 plots the frequency versus schedule factor for projects.
49
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Figure V - 4, Histogram, Schedule Incentives Effect on Schedule Factor
with positive, negative, both positive and negative, and projects without schedule
incentives
This histogram shows a normal distribution with a symmetrical vertical
axis located at a schedule factor value of 1.0 or unity. Again this is not surprising
since the majority of projects are completed reasonably close to the intended
completion dates. Figure V - 5 is the histogram for the effect of schedule
incentives on schedule growth. As shown, the data is normally distributed with a
vertical axis at a schedule growth value of 0.0. Since this measures the actual
51

schedule growth of the construction phase, and since most projects finish at or
very close to the original completion dates, this result is not unusual. Both of
these graphs show that the data is valid, normally distributed data with good
analysis potential.
The second statistical tool that was used to provide an evaluation of the
significance difference of the data was the F-test. F-test factors were calculated to
determine if the data exhibited significant differences based on the type of
incentive. An evaluation of the F-test values as calculated and the critical F-test



















Figure V - 5, Histogram, Schedule Incentives Effect on Schedule Growth
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significant difference in the data. It is hypothesized that the effects of schedule
incentives are very small, and that an F-test would not be able to differentiate
between contracts with or without schedule incentives.
The trend analysis for the effect of schedule incentives on schedule factor
and schedule growth is shown in Figure V - 6. For the schedule factor, the effects
of both negative and positive incentives caused a reduction in the schedule factor.
In summary, the hypothesis regarding improved schedule performance for
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Figure V - 6, Effect of Schedule Incentives on Schedule and Schedule Growth
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Moreover, the data established that even better performance was obtained when
positive incentives were used and that performance with both positive and
negative incentives was less then those with positive incentives, but better then
those with negative incentives.
The effect of both positive and negative incentives, although
demonstrating improved schedule performance over projects with no incentives,
does not show better performance than projects with negative incentives and
actually results in decreased performance than projects with positive incentives.
Thus, it can not be said that a combination of positive and negative incentives
provides the best schedule performance, and the original hypothesis is not proven
correct.
An examination of the schedule growth factor trend in Table V - 6 shows
that negative cost incentives slightly increased schedule growth by 1% and that
positive incentives provided the best schedule growth performance with 0%
schedule growth, an improvement of 10% over projects with no incentives. A
combination of both positive and negative incentives provided better performance
than both negative and no incentive projects, but was lower by 2% than those
projects with only positive incentives. As a result, the original hypothesis
regarding negative incentives and both positive and negative incentives is shown
to be only partially true. The hypothesis regarding positive incentives is proven to
be correct.
Most noteworthy, however, are the benefits provided by only positive
incentives. A 10% reduction in schedule growth over the life of a construction
54

project could easily result in an early completion measured in weeks. Hence,
positive incentives are shown to be the best option and should be utilized
exclusively.
Safety Incentives
Table V - 4 shows the calculated factor analysis that was completed for projects
with safety incentives. As with the cost and schedule incentive analysis, this table
is a summary of all the data collected from both contractors and owners. Like
projects with cost incentives, the number of projects with negative safety
incentives is limited. The number of projects with both positive and negative
incentives is also limited, although there are more projects with this type of
incentive than projects with negative incentives. Projects with positive incentives
and those projects without safety incentives were amply provided for this analysis
and the results should deem to yield a low margin of error.
As with the previous analysis, Table V - 4 includes the summary of the
calculated factors, with means, medians, standard deviations and variance. The F-
Test analysis that compares each type of incentive to each of the other types is
also shown.
The statistical validity of the data used was determined by the use of
histograms. Figure V - 7 plots the frequency versus the recordable incident rate
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Figure V - 7, Histogram, Effect of Safety Incentives on RIR
As shown in Figure V - 7, the data, while resembling a normal curve, has
significant "dips," particularly around the RIR value of 1.0. At this time the
meaning of this cannot be contributed to any known factor, but it is believed that
as more projects become available to CII, these irregularities will disappear and
the data will produce more normal results. Even with these irregularities, it is
obvious that the tendency is for projects to have a very low RIR, with many
projects approaching a zero RIR. This provides favorable results for the analysis
of this data. Figure V - 8 shows the frequency for LWCIR.
Figure V - 8 indicates a very strong tendency for the data to cluster around
the value of zero. This is to be expected since the frequency of serious accidents
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on projects will normally be very low. Since the data exhibits a consistent curve,
the validity of the data obtained is not questionable.
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Figure V - 8, Histogram, Effect of Safety Incentives on LWCER
The second statistical tool that was used to provide an evaluation of the
significance difference in the data was the F-test. F-test factors were calculated to
determine if the data exhibited significant differences based on the type of
incentive. An evaluation of the F-test values as calculated and the critical F-test
values shows that none of the calculated values meet the critical value, and thus
no significant difference in the data is noted. It is hypothesized that the effects of
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safety incentives are probably very small. Furthermore, an F-test would probably
not be able to differentiate between contracts with or without safety incentives.
A trend analysis of the effect of safety incentives on RIR and LWCIR is
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Figure V - 9, Effect of Safety Incentives on RIR and LWCIR
what was originally expected, with negative incentives providing better
performance than projects without incentives, positive incentives being better the
negative and no incentives and both positive and negative being the best.
Of significance is the fact that using both negative and positive incentives
provided a 78% decrease in the RJR. The use of safety incentives also provided
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decreases in the LWCER. As shown in Figure V - 9, the LWCIR rate was best
when both negative and positive incentives were used. Interestingly enough, the
trend analysis shows an increase of LWCIR for negative incentives, although it
should be noted that there were only three negative incentive projects upon which
to base this result. It is highly probable that a larger number of negative safety
incentive projects would show that the LWCIR is less for projects with negative
incentives versus projects with no incentives.
In summary, the hypothesis regarding safety performance is proven
correct. Negative safety incentives are better than no incentives, positive safety
incentives are better than negative safety incentives or no safety incentives and






This study began by asking the question: Are incentives effective? And if
so, can the benefits be quantified? And finally, what types of incentives are best?
Based on these questions, three hypotheses were developed that guided this study
of incentives. These three hypotheses will be examined individually to determine
the accuracy of their accuracy.
The First Hypothesis
"Projects with negative incentives have slightly better cost, schedule, and
safety performance than projects with no incentives"
To examine the results of the research on this hypothesis, Table VI - 1 has
been constructed from the data presented in Table V - 2, Table V - 3, and Table V
- 4. This table shows the effect of negative incentives upon construction projects.
As is readily seen, negative incentives hamper, and in some case seriously inhibit
the performance of construction contracts in cost, schedule and safety
performance. In fact, it is noted that the performance of these negative incentive
projects is worse than those contracts that offer no incentives.
However, in defense of negative incentives, it should be stated again that
the number of negative incentive projects for both cost and safety were extremely
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limited. It is possible that additional data in this area would still show that
negative incentives do perform worse than projects with no incentives. It is
theorized that the actual quantification of the negative performance would
moderate as the amount of data increased.
Consequently, the use of negative incentives for any purpose is not













Negative -6%* -12%* 3% -1% 29% ** -5% **
Positive 2% -2% 5% 10% 29% 49%
Both 3% -1% 3% 8% 47% 78%
Note: All percentages are relative to projects with no incentives.
* Based on 6 negative cost incentive projects.
** Based on 3 negative safety incentive projects.




"Projects with positive incentives have better cost, schedule and safety
performance than projects with no incentives or projects with only negative
incentives. "
Table VI - 1 shows that positive incentives result in better performance in
all area except in the areas of cost growth, where only a minor decrease was
noted. In many instances, it appears that owners use cost incentives on projects
that are poorly defined. The reasoning being that the owners know that potential
for poor cost performance due to a poorly defined scope of work, or an
incomplete set of plans may lead to major increases in construction costs. Owners
respond to this by introducing cost incentives to mitigate the potential for cost
over-runs. This leads to the assumption that the original cost estimates for cost
incentive projects are less accurate, and that the budget and cost growth factors
would be affected.
Another contributing factor is the fact that cost incentives are only used on
cost reimbursable contracts. These types of contracts generally have less defined
scopes of work, estimates are less accurate and many of these contracts are fast-
track projects. All of these factors produce results such as those obtained in this
study. Thus, it is believed that cost incentives are effective, although this is not
supported by the data.
63

In summary, positive incentives have been shown to result in better
performance than projects with negative incentives or projects with no incentives.
Thus the hypothesis as proposed is proven to be accurate.
The Third Hypothesis
"Projects with both positive and negative incentives have much better cost,
schedule and safety performance than projects with no incentives or projects with
only positive or negative incentives.
"
This hypothesis was formulated on the assumption that both positive and
negative incentives would provide a benefit to the project. As has been shown,
negative incentives actually inhibit the project. So what happens when negative
and positive incentives are combined? As Table VI - 1 illustrates; the results
obtained were mixed. In one case, the use of both positive and negative
incentives was extremely effective for safety performance. In the areas of cost
and schedule performance, the results showed that negative incentives inhibited
the performance or provided little benefit. The use of both types of incentives
results in better performance then negative incentives or projects with no
incentives. However, in most cases positive incentives performed as well as or
better then the use of both negative and positive incentives. Therefore, there is no
justification for the use of both positive and negative incentives in the area of cost
or schedule performance. In fact, the additional administrative resources required
to administer both of these incentives make this type of incentive impractical.
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In summary, the third hypothesis yields mixed results, with the use of both
positive and negative incentives extremely effective for safety performance, but
not recommended for cost or schedule performance. Hence, the original
hypothesis is only applicable to the use of safety incentives. Use of both positive
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